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ABSTRACT This article revisits modern Turkish political history with a specific focus on tra-
jectories of Turkish nationalism, from the end of the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire,
to the forms it takes under Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule today. The discussion is
theoretically embedded within a relational political–sociological framework that utilizes the
“field analysis” approach developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Using this approach, this paper
argues that a workable, explanatory political–sociological “surface” of analysis of Turkish
politics might be “the political field.” It further argues that inside this field of political
forces and competing groups, there is an ordering principle that supplies the political
actors with a set of beliefs concerning “what can be politicized for sustainable power.” In
this study, nationalism is treated as a kind of historically constituted and re-constituted “set
of beliefs,” or doxa in Bourdieu’s terminology. The paper further explores two long-lasting
“challenges” to Turkish nationalism, those of Islamist and Kurdish claims, and the recent tra-
jectories of these two forms of politics inside the field.
History is that of struggles between nations. Each nation strives for its own
existence. . . . Thus, we have shouldered the mission of the Turkish Nation.
There are no alien powers among us, and the Turkish people are backing us.
We tell ourselves, “Only the Turk is good to the Turk,” “The Turk has no
friend other than the Turk” and draw our strength from our people.
Alparslan Türkeş1
Introduction
Though nationalism is not the only topic of academic interest where the legitimate mode
of explanation becomes an issue within the competitive realm of rival analytical frame-
works, such ordinary political differences tend to surface more sharply between scholars
in the study of nationalism. Moreover, considering the fact that modern nationalisms
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originally emerged out of those social spaces which, today, are occupied by the forces of
today’s global hegemony, it is no surprise that there are still intellectual accounts of the
progressive or civic virtues of nationalism aiming to justify the historical trajectory of
Western civilizations as opposed to those trajectories doomed by ethnic rivalries.2
The study of nationalism is one area where a mechanism operates to separate and
oppose the sacred and profane elements of a democratic polity. Thus, in some academic
accounts, it appears very natural to demonize Serbian nationalism or Taliban funda-
mentalism, while applauding Swedish democracy or Turkish laicism. Meanwhile,
the ambitions behind French republicanism, the problematic assumptions of German
citizenship, or the ideals of NATO humanitarianism are usually taken for granted,
without reflecting on the epistemological homology between what is called legitimate
and illegitimate nationalisms. To illustrate this point through the consideration of the
bombardment of Serbia in 1999: the invention and distribution of credibility about why
the Serbian regime was evil depended on making it clear that the Western regimes
involved in that war were everything that the enemy could not be.3
If the study of nationalism is overburdened with structural misrecognitions in its
attempt to distinguish good and bad nationalisms, what shape might an alternative
approach (whose agenda is not only scientific but also on the side of a strongly demo-
cratic politics) take? Considering that the homologies between the nationalisms of
countries occupying unequal positions in today’s global order can be investigated,
would a study of one single case be helpful? This article does not seek another scho-
lastic claim about the correct representation of the problem of nationalism; instead, it
explores how a political–sociological approach that tries to account for the relation-
ality between structures and individuals is possible. To achieve this, the research
focuses on both past and recent dynamics of Turkish politics with a specific emphasis
on the role nationalism plays as a structuring logic within the Turkish political field.
The first section of the article introduces the basic theoretical framework that helps
position the proposed focus on nationalism in Turkish politics. The second section
discusses the emergence of, and changes in, the political field of Turkey, all the
way up to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. After this historical
discussion, the argument moves on to the investigation of two challenges in the era
following the 1980 coup which threatened nationalist hegemony—the dual (parami-
litary and ethno-social) Kurdish mobilization and the heterogeneous Islamist opposi-
tion with considerable electoral power and enduring influence. It is within the scope
of this paper to investigate to what extent these two challenges disrupted the structure
of the political field, and how the nationalist logic has been reshaped accordingly. In
conclusion, the question of the direction toward which the structure of Turkey’s pol-
itical field is moving is addressed with an emphasis on how the approach developed
might help shed light on the future trajectory.
A Relational Tool Box
As in most fields of social scientific research, objectivist and subjectivist epistem-
ologies are also in conflict in the study of nationalism. In the objectivist camp,
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Benedict Anderson, while introducing a valuable anthropological dimension by
drawing attention to (a) the symbolic economy of nationalism, and (b) the various
resources (from media to museums) that feed the “imagined constitution” of the
nation, remains very much Durkheimian.4 Like the founding father of French soci-
ology, who tended to privilege the category of “soul” (hence, “society”) to prove
the collective construction of social structures in people’s conscience, Anderson
sticks to objectivist assumptions in his search for a morphology of the imagination
of the nation. People, in Anderson’s account, appear only as carriers of languages
or memories who fulfill the task/function of imagination.
Partha Chatterjee, the famous multi-disciplinary scholar of Subaltern Studies,
supplies invaluable insights into nationalism with his distinction between the them-
atic and the problematic of a nationalist discourse and follows the trajectory of this
discourse through the chronological trajectory of moments of departure, maneuver
and arrival.5 Leaving aside the question of whether this approach is only suitable
for colonized geographies,6 Chatterjee’s model is problematic due to the privileged
status of the position-takings of prominent nationalists, without taking their positions
into account or investigating the contribution of other agents to the discourse. Thus,
while the épistèmè from which nationalist discourses are born surely has a structure,
Chatterjee treats this structure as if it is independent of the agents and institutions
which actualize it and bring it into existence, thereby ignoring the political–
sociological connections which accompany or underwrite such logical sequences.
In the subjectivist camp, on the other hand, objective conditions rarely make a
difference in the analysis of nationalism. Andrew Davison, for example, suggests a
hermeneutic approach for understanding the historical claims of Kemalism about
secular Republican virtues or national unity. However, he gets stuck at the level of
discourse when he rejects making causal explanations of why a certain nationalist
text (say, the First Congress of National Economy in Izmir, February 1923—a critical
moment in the genesis of nationalist hegemony in Turkey) takes this or that assump-
tion for granted, or what the material conditionings of the external world are, or how
come agents from different backgrounds agree (or disagree) with the discourse.7
Similarly, in a study on the biological-racist discourse disseminated by the Turkish
Anthropological Institute, Nazan Maksudyan invests too much in the strength and
coherence of the racist essence of Turkish nationalism, without focusing on the
social trajectories of the producers of that discourse, and the forms of utilization of
that discourse by political actors outside the circle of nationalist social scientists.8
This paper argues that understanding the subjective meanings of a certain text
should not be separated from causal explanations. To understand why a Kemalist-
laicist governor has a conservative view of Kurds, or why an ultra-nationalist
mayor purges Alevi employees from city services, requires more than a subjectivist
dive into the deconstruction of the text. Understanding is rather
to give oneself a generic and genetic comprehension of who these individuals
are, based on a (theoretical and practical) grasp of the social conditions of
which they are the product: this means a grasp of the circumstances of life
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and the social mechanisms that affect the entire category to which any individ-
ual belongs . . . and a grasp of the conditions, inseparably psychological and
social, associated with a given position and trajectory in social space.9
Following Bourdieu’s point here, it can also be argued that psychoanalytical expla-
nations of nationalism have subjectivist limitations. Such explanations mistakenly
tend to project a mode of explanation operating at the individual level (say, “fear
of castration” or “mirror stage”) to the institutional–structural level. While analogies
between the dilemmas of personal identity formation and experiences of national
identity can often be always useful, this brand of subjectivism tends to do away
with the vast complexity of intermediate relations and determinations that link
people to each other, and structures to people.
Homi Bhabha’s (a cultural–political theorist) attempt at an ambiguous deconstruc-
tion of the relationship between the “colonizer” and “colonized” is exemplary of this
kind of subjectivist theorizing on nationalism based upon problematic psychoanaly-
tical assumptions. According to Bhabha, the “hybridity” of Third World nationalism
is a result of the “closure and coherence attributed to the unconscious pole of colonial
discourse and the unproblematized notion of the subject,”10 which, in the end, puts a
limit on the effectiveness of colonial power and the Western subject’s desire to know
its Other. This limit is the source of all hybridization in nationalist discourse. Accord-
ing to Bhabha, this limit can then make possible the resistance of the hybrid “colo-
nized” to the disturbed “colonizer” through the act of “mimicry.” In his
framework, mimicry (of the colonizer, by the colonized) is a result of this
“lacking” homogenization of the colonial discourse. Mimicry,
problematizes the signs of racial and cultural priority, so that the “national” is
no longer naturalizable. What emerges between mimesis and mimicry is a
writing, a mode of representation, that marginalizes the monumentality of
history, quite simply mocks its power to be a model, that power which suppo-
sedly makes it imitable.11
Compelling as it may be, this mode of explanation is undone by what it chooses to
leave out of the equation, namely, history. That is, the historical principles of order-
ing, which govern practices of nationalism appear to be removed from the picture.
Bhabha’s claims to describe the conditions of colonial discourse—“mimicry
is. . .,” “hybridity is. . .”—seem always offered as static concepts, curiously
anthropomorphized so that they possess their own desire, with no reference
to the historical provenance of the theoretical material from which such con-
cepts are drawn, or to the theoretical narrative of Bhabha’s own work, or to
that of the cultures to which they are addressed.12
Bhabha’s invention of resistance out of hybridity—resistance of nationalisms against
colonial powers—is thus doomed to be a form of philosophical scholasticism, as long
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as we are not told about the political–sociological—and thus historical—connec-
tions. As this paper argues, in the case of Turkey, the re-hegemonizing power of
nationalism, especially when it faces serious challenges, cannot be written off so
easily merely by raising questions of ambiguity.
Obviously, it is impossible (and unnecessary) within the framework of this article
to contest all objectivist or subjectivist accounts of nationalism in order to justify the
sort of break that is being advocated here.13 Moreover, the divide between subjecti-
vists and objectivists is not absolute in terms of academic practice, and usually one
can find traces of both kinds of approaches in a single work. Furthermore, this
article is not claiming to resolve the problems of history-writing. Despite the interest
in the genesis of nationalist hegemony, and critical stance vis-à-vis official history-
writing, the driving motivation of the article should be described as making sense
of the contemporary situation. Nationalism in Turkey has experienced serious ups
and downs. One only needs to remember the February 1997 ultimatum of the
Army (famously referred as “Postmodern Coup” among the journalistic intelligentsia,
resulting in the banning of the Welfare Party14); the absolute triumph of the nation-
alist right and nationalist left in the 1999 elections; the drastic changes in global poli-
tics with the terrorist attacks of 2001; and the consequent electoral victories of the
AKP since 2002. A more concrete understanding of nationalism in Turkey will aid
understanding the limits and possibilities and the deepening of democracy in Turkey.
With all this said, clarification of the concepts that will be employed in the article is
called for. The inventory of the conceptual toolbox offered here can be listed as
follows: the discussion will develop based on the understanding of politics as a
field, which is historically a stage for struggles over the distribution of political
and economic capital, governed by a nationalist doxa. This structure always influ-
ences the habitus of political agents and other peripheral agents, who all assume
various position-takings with respect to nationalism. These position-takings are
explainable through their relationship to the agents’ positions and to the structure
of the field of power. Below, these italicized concepts are briefly explained.
According to Bourdieu, a relational social analysis should begin first by defining
the social space (whether of politics, art or education, however, the scholar is limiting
his or her scope) that is going to be investigated. That construct constitutes the ground
in the context of which statements concerning the dialectic between positions and dis-
positions, or between fields and habitus, are produced. It should be noted that Bour-
dieu himself is not much interested in those occasions where anomie, contingencies
or irregularities govern the coordinates of a social space. Not that he ignores such
instances, but rather, his research stresses how ordering principles (instead of
occasions of lawlessness) and structural influences organize the social space,
which is a locus of possibilities and potentialities.
Therefore, “field” as a tool concept is constructed upon the social space, which is
understood as a special arena where social positions (whose history precedes that of
the individuals who occupy it) and position-takings (agents’ conscious or uncon-
scious perception of their position, and their related beliefs and practices) are in a
mutual relationship. A field also always operates duo-dimensionally. It is first a
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forcefield, where relationships among positions and among dispositions are con-
strained and hierarchized by certain external mechanisms (material or symbolic).
However, it is also a battlefield, where, despite the constraints and hierarchies,
agents and groups of agents are in constant struggle against each other over the
control of material and symbolic resources, whose distribution governs the forces
that organize the field. Consequently, in Bourdieu’s words, a field may be defined
as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations
they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and
potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of
power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits
that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other pos-
itions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).15
Given this relational definition, how should one map the space of the political
field? The primary analytical importance is to reveal the integrating logic of compe-
tition between opposing viewpoints. Bourdieu tries to seek out conflict sources in
politics and attempts to relate these sources to other fields, and to class and power.
Yet, when he talks about politics as a field, he only has in mind party politics (and
that in terms of French parliamentarism). According to Bourdieu, the field of politics
has a dual structure:
On one side is the field of ideological production, a relatively autonomous uni-
verse in which, amidst competition and conflict, the instruments for thinking
the social are created and where, through this process, the field of the politically
thinkable, or, to put it another way, the legitimate problematic, is defined. On
the other side are social agents, occupying different positions in the field of
class relations and defined by a greater or lesser specific political compe-
tence—a greater or lesser capacity to recognize a political question as political
and treat it as such by responding to it politically, i.e., on the basis of specifi-
cally political principles (rather than ethical ones, for example).16
Setting this overall view, he argues that the logic of this field can be explained in
terms of supply and demand, where a host of political programs, issues, discourses,
campaigns, views are supplied, to be consumed by a mass of citizens. For the pur-
poses of this article, nationalism is treated as the logic behind this regime of
supply. While it is reinforced by the official instruments of ideological production,
in time it becomes a relatively independent logic as it begins to create its creators.17
In the political field, the rules are established so that certain agents have the auth-
ority to speak about politics, to determine what is discussable (i.e. what is politiciz-
able, what is allowed inside politics) and what is not. In that sense, upper-class or
upwardly mobile middle-class professionals dominate the field. To account for the
power relations among agents within the political field (from the ordinary party
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militant to the party as propaganda machine), Bourdieu posits that the workings of the
symbolic economy within the field determine who occupies which position, and to
substantiate that, he offers to expand the concept of “capital.”18 To explain the
struggles over the definition of “what can be considered as political,” according to
this expansion, certain amounts of symbolic and economic resources should be accu-
mulated, which also means that certain other people will be excluded from this
accumulation and be exploited. Therefore, inside the political field, actors are
distributed
(1) according to the overall volume of the political capital (and also other capitals)
they possess,
(2) according to the relative weight of economic capital and political capital in their
patrimony, and
(3) according to the evolution over time of the volume and structure of their
capital.19
Therefore, actors desiring to be initiated into politics should master the practical
logic of the political field (i.e. being subjected to its values, hierarchies, censorship,
internal fights and so on). As will be demonstrated in the following sections, in the
case of Turkey, political movements and parties, while appearing to be saying radi-
cally different things all internalize this practical logic, which becomes common to
all, and which is hardly questioned. Doxa (literally meaning “correct belief”) is the
term Bourdieu uses for the state of misrecognition or non-consciousness of the inter-
nalized rules of this game. Doxa corresponds to a set of beliefs, assumptions, categ-
orizations, a product of objective structural conditions of the field (internal and
external) and influencing individual dispositions. A crude analogy may be made to
the software of a computer game, which may allow infinite play and a vast array
of differently realized scenarios, but always according to an unchanging binary
logic of 1s and 0s, with which the code of the software is written.20
Bourdieu further holds that political parties are the most important players, “com-
bative organizations specially adapted so as to engage in this sublimated form of civil
war by mobilizing in an enduring way, through prescriptive predictions, the greatest
possible number of agents endowed with the same vision of the social world and its
future.”21 In Bourdieu’s understanding, parties are the agents that are more likely to
influence the dynamics of the political field.
Within a political party, there exists an ethos that legitimizes the claim to represent
a certain group or groups. Around this ethos, this symbolic power is shaped according
to the interests of the dominant actors. These political professionals produce the
choices and opinions which bring them votes and thus political power:
All political judgments, including the would-be most enlightened ones, inevi-
tably contain an element of implicit faith, due to the very logic of political
choice, which is a choice of spokesmen and representatives and also a
choice of ideas, projects, programmes, plans, embodied in “personalities”
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and depending for their reality and credibility on the reality and credibility of
these “personalities.”22
So, building upon this, political capital becomes a “form of symbolic capital, credit
founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable
operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or an object) the very powers
that they recognize in him (or it).”23
This mechanism for the distribution and accumulation of political capital helps
understand how the aura around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk grew, and how his represen-
tation (along with the representation of the Ottomans, the Independence War, or the
pre-Selchuk era) became a significant issue within the contemporary political field.
Political capital can be based on fame, that is, being known and having a good repu-
tation, available only to a few dominant agents inside the field. It can also be based on
loyalty, recognition, which is not a personal capital but can only be accumulated by
the political organization itself. In this form, the party gains militants, followers, new
bureaucrats and most crucially, votes. This capital, through loyalty, is accumulated by
structural mechanisms, party employment, task division, education and so on, and by
the agents’ dispositions, which “party officials or militants implement in their daily
practice and in their properly political action.”24 Loyalty in operation for recruitment
for various legal political groups is also another means by which nationalist senti-
ments and dispositions are acquired.
These conscious or unconscious acquisitions of attitudes, beliefs and practices
related to the political field bring us to the final tool, perhaps the sharpest and thus
the most difficult to handle: Habitus is a concept that Bourdieu suggested to
explain the relations between
(1) the doxa of a particular field,
(2) the field’s objective conditions, internal or external,
(3) individual practices and attitudes. Briefly, habitus is “a set of dispositions,
created and formulated through the conjuncture of objective structures and per-
sonal history.”25
It operates from within agents; it is embodied by agents, being the internalization of
the externality of field dynamics.
In the case of the workings of the political field, habitus works as a strategy-gen-
erating principle that enables agents to cope with the requirements (as well as unfore-
seen surprises) of politics. Through its mediation, the agent is supplied with a system
of lasting and transposable dispositions (attitudes, patterns of explanation, value judg-
ments, etc.) which (a) integrate past experiences (“What should Atatürk mean to
me?”), (b) equip the agent to decode the current ongoings of the field (“Why are
Kurds troubling us?”) and (c) help her customize her dispositions to what the
future may bring (“What will happen if we become a member of EU?”). It is impor-
tant to understand that nationalist logic is mediated differently to people occupying
different positions. As a “structured” and “dynamic” structure at the same time
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(hence its sharpness as a tool), habitus may at times help external conditionings colo-
nize the body, or at times enable the body to be ready for the unexpected.
Under the guidance of this analytical model, the discussion concerning the
mapping of Turkey’s political field becomes easier to navigate through.
Genesis and the Structure of the Field
In this section, the argument concerning the political field will be substantiated by
focusing on a general outline of the history of modern Turkey. By first analyzing
the position of the political field within the field of power and its evolution in
time, and then analyzing the internal structure of the field by investigating the struc-
ture of objective relations between positions occupied by individuals and groups
placed in a situation of competition for legitimacy, regularities inside the political
field can be theoretically explained, and related to the sphere of economics and
culture.
From Domination to Hegemony
The emergence of the social positions which facilitated the ideological production of
Turkish nationalism after the second half of the nineteenth century is causally related
to the economic peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire beginning earlier in that
century. The emergence of Turkish nationalism is also related to the corresponding
policies of modernization and institution building, beginning more aggressively
with the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) and continuing with the structural
reforms in what is commonly known as the Tanzimat era (1839–76).26 As the legit-
imate inheritors of this first modernization period, nationalist intellectuals clashed
with the imperial authority, out of which the modern Turkish political field dynami-
cally emerged. This transformation began with the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II
(1876–1908). Undeniably a time of growing troubles for the Empire, in terms of
the loss of control of land surrounding Anatolia, economic crises, threat and pressure
of wars, and political mobilization against the Palace, the infamous period of istibdat
(tyranny) marked the genesis of a Turkish nationalist habitus. The ideology which
governed various nationalist dispositions until the July 1908 revolution by the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress (CUP) would later help consolidate the dominating
logic of the political field.
At this point, it is illuminating to recall a long-standing debate among students of
modern Turkish history—the well-known continuity debate between scholars identi-
fying with Kemalism and official history-writing, and politically heterogeneous criti-
cal scholars. Basically, scholars who are critical of Kemalism27 draw attention to the
continuing role of the CUP and its principles until the end of the one-party regime
(1950), and also the continuity between the institutions of Ottoman modernization
and Kemalist modernization. On the other hand, defenders of discontinuity (e.g.
Sina Akşin28) stress the revolutionary aspects of Atatürk’s leadership, the rupture
caused by the transition to Western democratic values and the significance of the
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War of Independence. While it is true that Unionists never imagined the abolishment
of the sultanate, and that Atatürk’s personal ambitions about republicanism and mod-
ernization caught many political figures inside his circle of power by surprise after
1922, the Independence War period (1919–22) did not lead to a break with the
already established structure of the political field. On the contrary, it led to the deci-
sive domination of the Turkish brand of nationalism over other millets, a process that
had already begun during the era of “despotism” (istibdat), and more combatively
continued by the CUP after 1908.
The nationalist opposition to the Hamidian regime, and the spread of Turkish sen-
timents after 1876, is basically related to two social positions, which both originated
in the middle class and emerged as a result of a series of nineteenth century edu-
cational reforms. This institutional conditioning was reinforced in various ways:
first, by the imperial propaganda for unity against growing nationalisms among influ-
ential groups within the Kurdish, Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Egyptian, Syrian and
other millets; second, by the widely circulating (at least among those who had the cul-
tural capital to follow and interpret them) texts of the Enlightenment thought. The
effects of these factors became inscribed in the habitus of the new nationalist agents.
The first position was the literary intellectual, occupied by ethnic Turks primarily
from Anatolia, but also at times from Azerbaijan and other Caucasian countries, who
were well educated and familiar with European literary forms, who practiced one or
more of these forms, and usually wrote for journals.29 Though there are dozens of
influential writers, poets, novelists and journalists to consider, Şemsettin Sami
(1850–1904),30 Namık Kemal (1840–88),31 Ömer Seyfettin (1884–1920),32
Tekin Alp (1883–1961),33 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935),34 and Ziya Gökalp
(1876–1924) are among the first to name.35 At this point, it is important to note
that, in the period preceding CUP hegemony inside the political field, cultural pro-
duction by the occupiers of this position does not completely correspond to what
Anderson refers to as “imagining the nation through printed media.” For one thing,
the varying and competing claims concerning the definitions of “Turkishness,”
“being Turan,” “Ottomanism,” “central authority” and so on do not correspond to
an imagining process of an independent nation-state. Inside the peculiar conditions
the Empire was in, they should rather be interpreted as reactions to the disintegration
of the Empire, and as pleas to the Sultan to hold the Ottoman realm together. This
extensive cultural production did not have a concrete political program until the occu-
piers of the second position, junior and senior officers of the Ottoman army, decided
to take matters into their own hands. Only the officers had the means to mobilize this
new species of political capital to exert their influence over the central authority.
Although there is a brief period of opposition to Istanbul by a few military officers
who joined the marginal Young Ottomans group before the CUP began its oper-
ations,36 there certainly was a lag between the circulation of Turkish nationalist
and patriotic ideals among civilian-intellectual circles and their spread among mili-
tary circles. One explanation might be that Abdülhamit was fully focused on moder-
nizing the army. As a result, professional training colleges like Harbiye (War
Academy), Bahriye (Naval Academy) and Tıbbiye-yi Askeriye (Military Medical
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Academy) underwent vast changes, despite the fact that the authoritarian Sultan
would not allow the process to spread beyond the circle of imperial administration.
Therefore, institutions of education preparing young men for military careers were
the most advanced (and, for curricular purposes, most westernized) ones, even sur-
passing the modern (non-religious, non-military) secondary and high schools,
whose establishment had begun before the istibdat era.
Intellectual ideals were more easily distributed among junior officers, who began to
read patriotic works, along with the Western classics of the Enlightenment era
(including romantic-nationalist French and German literature), while arming them-
selves with critical political reflection on the Empire under the rule of the absolute
monarch, Abdülhamit II. The Sultan, in the eyes of the officers, was one of the
main reasons for ridiculing of the Empire as the “sickly man of Europe.” The
seeds of the CUP were sown when, in 1889, students at the Military Medical
College in Gülhane founded İttihad-ı Osmanı̂ Cemiyeti (Society of Ottoman
Unity), whose main purpose was to put an end to the rule of tyranny and to reinstate
the constitution that had been arbitrarily suspended by the Sultan soon after he was
enthroned.37 In five years, this organization expanded, attracting intellectual civil ser-
vants like the well-known CUP activist Ahmet Rıza (1859–1930). It began publish-
ing the journal Meşveret (Consultation) and renamed itself İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti
(CUP).
It is true that, until the 1908 revolution, there were a lot of opposition groups,
whether nationalist or liberal, both inside and outside the military. For example, let
us consider Teşebbüs-ü Şahsı̂ ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (Society for Private
Initiative and Decentralization), Prince Sabahattin’s far less nationalist faction in
the 1902 Congress of the Ottoman Liberals. The organization was also supported
by progressive Armenian organizations and Jewish and Bulgarian socialist
groups.38 If such an organization had mobilized the support of the officers, the struc-
ture of the political field would have been dramatically different. However, the
modern Ottoman army was overwhelmingly Turkish in ethnic origin and central-
ist/patriotic dispositions were more likely to be in use due to military officers’
social position. For example, despite these nationalist officers’ personal hatred of
the Sultan, they nevertheless continued loyally to perform the military tasks
ordered by the Palace. Both before and after 1908, leading military figures of the
CUP, ambitious young men, like Talat Paşa (1874–1921),39 Enver Paşa (1881–
1922),40 İsmet İnönü (1884–1973)41 and Mustafa Kemal, were all successful officers
who had progressed speedily through the ranks, even though the Palace was mostly
aware of their political plotting.
The process of domination by Turkish nationalism inside the political field gained
new momentum through the role the CUP played in the coups of 1908 and 1913, and
by the pressures of the Balkan War. It was at this point that the political power accu-
mulated by the CUP (both in terms of military forces and civil organization) became
the legitimate power in defining the enemies and friends of the Empire. This led to
the banning of socialist groups, the controversial episode of the forced migration
of the Armenian population, the re-establishment of a paramilitary/secret police
Historical “Stickiness” of Nationalism 319
organization, banning of strikes and so on. However, the doxa (of “ethnic pride,” “the
right of Turks to state rule,” or “unity of the state”) was still unstructured, because of
both widespread instability throughout the Empire, and also the continued existence
of an imperial dynasty that was always suspicious of CUP activities. Ottoman imper-
ial authority remained intact until the end of World War I, and because it had
undoubtedly inscribed a distinct logic of obligation and belongingness on its subjects
over the preceding centuries, nationalism was not yet dominant as the mode of oper-
ation of the political field.
The partition of the Empire at the end of the war also provided the necessary con-
ditions for the emerging dominance of nationalism. Various forces, including the
CUP network, all employed a nationalist discourse of unity and solidarity. It was
not, of course, a coherent and smoothly operating logic: the practice of organizing
the resistance, seeking political support from local business owners and rural land-
lords, or persuading Kurdish tribal leaders to join the coming insurrection each
required nationalist delegates and Army officers to master pragmatism above all.
The strategic tools used in securing the loyalty of those recruited in resistance
forces included Islam, the Ottoman understanding of cooperation between millets,
demonization of the Western forces and condemnation of the Palace. The political
field enclosed upon itself during this period of military mobilization and war
making in Anatolia. This transformation meant that the nationalist logic eventually
completely dominated the coordinates of the political sphere.
Atatürk’s faction42 triumphed in the political struggle to define the legitimate
means to wage the anti-occupation war, mostly as a result of its successful establish-
ment of a new parliament in Ankara, and by doing what the CUP had not been able to,
or had not dared to, attempt since 1908. This was namely, delegitimizing Istanbul’s
imperial authority by condemning the Palace’s policies of collaboration with
England, thereby effectively questioning the Sultan’s patriotism. By the end of the
war in 1922, the Kemalist faction had successfully monopolized all sources of the dis-
tribution of political capital. Religious groups inside the parliament were (albeit tem-
porarily) won over through the employment of the discourse of jihad, and by the
various activities of consecration of the many martyrs who had died for the patriotic
cause. The peasant majority and the working poor of the cities were won over through
the image of the victorious Army. Although they were an ethnically heterogeneous
mass, the simple fact that a war had been won by the Ankara government against
a contentious enemy was sufficient for political support. In the eyes of the people,
a new Sultan was needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the war. It was this credit
collected by Atatürk and his circle which allowed the Kemalists, at least initially,
to silence the combined opposition within the Ankara parliament.
It was this initial monopoly over the legitimate definitions of what was proper to be
politicized which allowed the nationalist alliance between the two social positions
mentioned above (that of non-military intellectuals and of military officers) to
replace the Empire with the Republic. To stabilize the new state of things, and to
make the necessary diplomatic and commercial arrangements in order to re-establish
the regime’s peripheral place in the world economy, the government in Ankara
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decided to spend its political credit aggressively. At the expense of the popular
support of various Sunni elements in urban and rural Turkey, and by sacrificing
the support of many Kurdish tribes, Kemalist nationalist logic was now employed
to govern the painfully difficult project of nation-state building.
The story of the one-party regime under the rule of Atatürk (“The Great Leader”)
and then of İnönü (“The National Chief”) until 1950 is mostly the story of the regime
spending its reserves of political capital (in other words, rapidly losing its credibility
and popular support) by various autocratic means in order to consolidate state power.
As the monopoly of the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi) ended and the multi-party era began, two enduring characteristics of the pol-
itical field could be identified. The first was crystallization of the “Republican cos-
mology” at the core of the political capital. This was concerned with the
consecration of the personality of Atatürk and of his statist principles, the will to
be among the “modern civilizations,” and the invention of the Turk as the super-iden-
tity (üst kimlik) which bound the citizens together. The cosmology did not condition
the dispositions of different political agents in exactly the same way, but it became
“taken for granted.” Against this doxa, Islamist and Kurdish politicization became
fundamental challenges.
The second characteristic was the enduring position of the military inside the field,
whose rank-and-file officers had been imposing their agenda, using their political
capital in conservative ways upon successive civilian rulers. Many officer cliques
had emerged and fallen, some had re-appeared at times, positions had changed and
class relations had gained new momentums. However, the military had remained
an influential player. As leading scholars of Turkey argue, the structural continuities
between the Empire and the Republic are largely responsible for the military’s “rela-
tive autonomy” from civilian rule and accountability.43 This endurance was further
strengthened until the end of the one-party regime, as the occupiers of the old position
of military officers were organically linked to all sorts of civilian governmental insti-
tutions, as well as to the newly emerging (and carefully groomed) Turkish
bourgeoisie.
From the perspective of the evolution of the political field, the Democratic Party’s
(DP, Demokrat Parti) 1950 victory was not a break. As Feroz Ahmad, in his The
Making of Modern Turkey, demonstrates, although the party was a manifestation
of popular opposition against the Kemalist core, it was also an instrument of the
newly prospering commercial bourgeoisie and the big landowners, who found it
more and more costly to negotiate with statist policies.44 Thus, the DP mobilized pol-
itical capital without challenging the nationalist doxa. It sought different allies, but
turned out to be as authoritarian as its political adversary in the end. The DP’s
failed economic program (whose turning point was the 1958 devaluation) alienated
the military, which demanded more resources in order to modernize its technologies
as it integrated into the new command structure of NATO.
The 1960 coup marked a moment of exception because revolutionary officers,
mostly junior soldiers who despised the pro-DP old guard, acted outside the chain
of command at a time when there were rival factions inside the military. The generals
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learned their lesson from this experience, and the post-1960 reforms in the military
successfully ensured that this kind of autonomous action would never happen
again. The military budget continually increased. The Army also undertook crucial
reforms of its organizational and educational apparatuses, guaranteeing that all pol-
itical interventions after 1960 would be initiated by the High Command.
To the soldiers’ dismay, civilians could never march in orderly columns inside the
political field. Although the ruling parties were in consensus with respect to the exter-
nal dictates of the Cold War and the demands of global capital until 1980, the political
field faced its first serious challenge during the 1970s. Dissident voices of political
Sunni and Alevi groups, Kurdish nationalists and the legal and illegal radical left
echoed through the field. The army’s call for anti-communist crackdowns, the nation-
alist unity in its 1971 ultimatum, and the various coalition governments did not bring
about harmonization of the political field. Not even the infamous “Nationalist Front”
coalitions of the late 1970s helped, though they did facilitate the insertion of ultra-
right and Islamist cadres into state institutions, not to mention the official support
given to paramilitary groups against all elements of the left.
More importantly, external pressures dictated that Turkey’s long-standing nationa-
lized developmentalism, which had governed the economic domain, had to be
replaced by institutional reforms for the implementation of free market measures.
However, successive governments were simply incapable of taking the bold steps.
Instead, the Army, being unified and organized in itself, well-informed about what
was to be done, having made the logic of the field the air it breathed, was ready to
do whatever was necessary to ensure the imposition of neoliberalism. Allied with
the National Intelligence Agency and the right-wing majority of the police forces,
the military, operating under its nationalist logic, once again mobilized its resources
to create the concrete conditions to justify a military takeover.45
The 1980 coup marked the end of the domination of the symbolic and material vio-
lence of nationalism in Turkey, and thereafter (with the 1983 return to civilian rule
and the coming to power of the neoliberal Motherland Party), nationalism gradually
became hegemonic. Until 1950, the political field operated like a machine; its poten-
tial for giving birth to unpredictable, out-of-control political movements was pre-
vented by the autocratic rule of the CHP. The domination of nationalism inside the
field continued after the end of the one-party era as the field opened itself, as a
result of external pressures, to the conflict of various political forces. However,
only the most marginal (and quickly repressed) groups dared question the very exis-
tential assumptions of the Republican cosmology and the regime’s ties with capital.
On the other hand, political economic reforms after the 1980 coup facilitated
drastic cultural changes. These included the integration of the rural poor into the
urban middle-lower and working classes, and the emergence of an upwardly
mobile white-collar class. For the bourgeois entrepreneurs, the neoliberal reforms
of the late 1980s and 1990s created even better conditions to compete with
Western multinationals. The field of cultural production established new connections
with commodity markets, absorbing the depoliticized generation of youngsters after
the coup. The Turkish–Islamic modification of higher and national education,
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oppressive measures taken against oppositional social movements, and the strength-
ening of mafia-like networks among military, police officers and ex-paramilitary
leaders were also happening side by side with the ongoing social changes. Moreover,
the mainstream parties of the central left and right obeyed similar rules in continuing
the process of consecrating the Kemalist legacy, though not necessarily in ways the
military would have liked.
Despite this continuity, it can be argued that the structural changes inside the econ-
omic field, until today, and also Turkey’s encounter with the EU (first as a member of
the Customs Union and then as an official candidate for membership), imposed
changes in the political field by facilitating the emergence of new social positions.
Both the existence of different positions and dispositions and the objective conditions
led to a relaxation of the nationalist hold on the polity. The AKP’s 2002 electoral
victory and the ensuing democratic initiatives have further facilitated this process.
For one thing, the state was no longer successful in controlling the definition of the
legitimate means of interpreting the Republican cosmology. The public defenses of
nationalist ideology and policies more and more frequently stressed nationalism’s
civic virtues (like modernization, development) rather than its racist and anti-demo-
cratic shortcomings. At the same time, criticism of the logic of nationalism from the
Turkish left, the Kurdish movement, and from various factions of the religious–con-
servative right, became more and more commonly heard. The political field was
being transformed by a number of forces: first, the combination of concessions
made to the advancing market forces was at play. In connection, the economic dis-
comfort experienced by both unionized and non-unionized employees was
growing. Moreover, the military and non-military elements within the state were
trying to resurrect nationalist domination by campaigning against “the Islamist
threat” and “the Kurdish-separatist threat.” Nevertheless, despite years of AKP gov-
ernment, the waning of the political influence of the military and the widening of the
array of political possibilities through certain democratic initiatives, the nationalist
logic maintains its hegemony over the political field.
A further change in Turkey’s political field relates to the dynamics of post-9/11
global politics. As the War Against Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan unfolded,
the AKP government saw an opportunity to challenge the status of Israel in the
Middle East, in terms of strengthening peace and stability. The government made
moves to position itself as a better broker between Western countries and the
region’s Muslim populations. New democratic opportunities emerged, but without
resolving or negotiating the principal challenges (that of the Kurdish movement
and of political Islam) against the nationalist logic. The AKP mobilized its decisive
control (since the 2007 general elections and the 2009 municipal elections) over the
parliament and municipal authorities to challenge, only partially successfully, the
influence of the military in governmental and policy-making affairs. With the contro-
versial Ergenekon lawsuit, steps were taken to dismantle the dysfunctional paramili-
tary elements within the state, which had become entrenched during the years of war
against Kurdish insurgents.46 From the perspective of the structure of the political
field, it can be argued that, by 2010, new opportunities had emerged for the political
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actors inside the field to move Turkey toward a more ideal-typical liberal democracy
from being an entrenched, nationalist electoral democracy.47
However, despite opportunities for deepening democracy in Turkey, the ethno-
centric, authoritarian and conservative profile of the nationalist logic of the field
was far from being dismantled under the AKP rule. A more complete assessment
of why this is so necessitates an inquiry into two critical contemporary challenges
against the structure of the field that relate to the public claims of Sunni-religious
and Kurdish-ethnic identity politics.
“Impostors in the Temple”: Religious and Ethnic Challenges
The opposition of orthodox Sunni groups and Kurdish distrust of the Kemalist regime
during the 20 years following the 1980 coup have a deeply rooted history in the
development of the Republic. While the historical details of these connections are
beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note one thing related with the struc-
ture of the political field. The initial (i.e. pre-World War II) assumptions of the Kem-
alist logic about religious and ethnic elements within the boundary of the nation-state
were, in the late 1980s and 1990s, once again mobilized by dominant political actors
to decode the Kurdish insurrection and the Islamist electoral victories as threats
against nationalist unity. At the beginning, the Republic had invented itself by mono-
polizing and controlling public representations of Islam and by radically denying
Kurdish difference. The emergence of these contemporary forms of politics which
undermined the operation of the nationalist logic was therefore interpreted as sacri-
lege. Until the 2002 elections, all governments, harmonizing their politics with the
agenda of the military, carried out legal, public, illegal and parliamentary campaigns
attempting to eliminate problems, thus normalizing the nationalist logic in its con-
trolled religious, conservative and ethnocentric state.
However, the political field could not be used, as it had been in the one-party era, as
an apparatus to dominate social and economic processes outside its boundaries. There
were too many dents and holes in the armor. Instead, uncontrollable forms of identity
politics, integrated with the changing economic conditions, emerged. Therefore, the
regime’s battles (and those of consenting elements inside society) against such threats
had to be carried out in the form of entrenched hegemonic struggles rather than an all-
out war. Yet within these struggles, the strategic advantage remained in the hands of
those who had mastered the nationalist logic.
The Religious-Political Challenge
Of the two challenges, the rise of the religious Welfare Party (beginning with its
victory in the municipal elections of 1994) as the gravitational center of a number
of heterogeneous Islamist groups was, arguably, less disturbing for the nationalist
logic than the Kurdish politicization. The post-2002 integration of the AKP into
the nationalist logic, as it abandoned the more outwardly Islamist forms of conserva-
tive politics, demonstrates that point.
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Most assuredly, when media discourses, the campaigns of pro-establishment civil
society organizations and concrete measures taken by the state are carefully exam-
ined, the tendency was to reduce the heterogeneity of Sunni religious politics to a
single, totalized enemy. However, this strategy was not credible enough in the
eyes of the public, which in turn problematized the assumptions of the regime
about “uncontrolled Islam.” Meanwhile, the social positions occupied by the domi-
nant figures of Welfare Party politics armed them with dispositions which led to
the preaching of another nationalist version of the “civilizing project,”48 one with reli-
gious implications.
After the Welfare Party was banned, its successor, the Virtue Party, abandoned the
more radically fundamentalist elements of Islamist politics. Its leaders became inter-
ested in the newly emerging conservative business circles, supported by their most
precious supporters from small provinces and towns, the petty entrepreneurs.
These two socio-economic groups’ social positions depended on the business connec-
tions they had secured in their competition with the culturally secular, more pro-
Western business groups, which traditionally preferred mainstream right-wing
parties. The Virtue Party, not for pragmatic purposes to prevent another ban, but in
order to stabilize the movement’s position in the center of the political field as an
establishment party willing to play the game, tried to move toward a confused
mixture of social democracy and reformist Islamism.49 For example, the party’s
MPs, back in 2000, allied with more left-wing political groups in supporting the
EU accession process, and in public criticisms of the anti-democratic activities of
the state, such as its condemnation of the project to switch from prison dormitories
to cells advocated by the Ministry of Justice. However, the perceived threat of the
party against the regime, as well as the inner struggles within the party, prevented
it becoming mainstream, and the party was banned in June 2001.
Until the banning of the Virtue Party, the organization appeared to have continued
to hold a monopoly over what was politicizable for pious Sunni citizens. However,
the banning decision further convinced Tayyip Erdoğan’s faction that the National
Outlook movement’s monopoly over the political representation of Sunni identity
politics was no longer sustainable without further mainstreaming conservative poli-
tics. The traditionalist faction within the National Outlook movement rejected such
an integrationist incursion within the political field, sticking with their version of reli-
gious identity politics inside the newly formed Felicity Party after 2001.
Beginning with the AKP victory in the 2002 elections, it can be argued, within the
analytical framework offered in this article, that the political field entered a significant
but not fundamental episode of restructuring, which was still unfolding toward the
end of the second term of the Erdoğan government.
On the one hand, it is notable that, as a result of the AKP policies, there was a shift,
between 2002 and 2010, from the dull and insincere electoral-democratic political
environment toward an embattled, largely imperfect, but achievement-oriented
liberal-democratic environment. For better or worse, from a purely comparative
(compared with previous post-1980 administrations) perspective, the Erdoğan
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government appeared to have distanced itself from the repressive operations of the
nationalist logic of the field. This is seen in various initiatives.
Constitutional amendments reduced military autonomy and strengthened govern-
mental oversight of the affairs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Parliament implemented
EU-related harmonization packages in spheres like freedom of association, freedom
of expression, minority rights. The government launched an initiative for major con-
stitutional reform and adopted a new Civil Code and Criminal Code. Finally, there
was genuine political engagement (with not-so-positive results by the end of 2010)
with a de-militarized policy to reconcile Kurdish demands. All these actions supplied
AKP with considerable political capital within the field, which allowed the party to
accumulate enough social credibility to carry it successfully through two national
elections, two municipal elections and the contentious referendum of September
2010.50
Yet, on the other hand, the electoral and democratic success of the AKP in office
does not mean that the whole field has been transformed and its nationalist modus
operandi has shifted toward a more liberal logic of constitutional citizenship.
While the AKP policies have, intentionally or not, created opportunities inside the
polity for pushing the government (especially via civil society and social movement
organizations) toward deeper democratic reform, after seven years, the AKP’s actual,
though unintended function has been the completion of the absorption, and thus neu-
tering, of the Islamist challenge to the hegemonic logic of Turkey’s political field.51
In Turkey, there has been, historically speaking, ceaseless competition over the
proper monopolization of political capital inside the field. Political entrepreneurs,
whether they have secular, militarist, Atatürkist, religious, conservative, centrist,
anti-communist or pan-Turkist dispositions, share, mostly unconsciously, the nation-
alist doxa, once they are socialized and politicized into the rules of the game (when
“politics as a vocation” becomes inscribed on their habitus). Through their power
struggles, as a result of which political capital is mobilized to articulate certain
other interests, they compete over how to secure control (and, they hope, domination)
over what can properly be politicized and represented inside the field. This explains
the various clashing claims over the cultural–historical contents of the “Turkish
people,” over the transcendental definition of state and country, and over the delicate
balance to be struck between citizens’ duties and their rights and liberties.
For a period, in the 1990s, the Islamist challenge to the doxa (the glue that had been
holding the political field together for a long time) had the potential to overwhelm the
field, not in terms of (as is often argued) replacing the Republic with a religious theoc-
racy, but in terms of reversing the unequal distribution of political and economic
capital by mobilizing the urban and rural poor under the promise of religious solidar-
ity and religious freedom. Well before other political actors (including the military),
who were the adversaries of the National Outlook movement, the rank-and-file of the
Welfare Party, increasingly frequented by upwardly mobile businessmen, had seen
the risk of failing to contain the effects of their public-religious message. Therefore,
AKP’s emergence and political success, above all, can be explained by its skillful
monopolization of the representation of religious–conservative sentiments to
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contain the risk of religiously motivated outrage against those “old” political actors
who were largely perceived to have betrayed the people in the aftermath of the
1999–2002 economic (and social) crisis.52 Moreover, unlike the authoritarian
attempts of the military, exemplified by the so-called February 28th Process, and
the later affirmation of the military’s mindset by secularist elements of the judiciary
(leading to banning of two National Outlook parties), AKP’s containment strategy
neatly remained within the confines of electoral democracy, backed by a discourse
of rights and liberties. It was thus AKP’s rank-and-file who re-harmonized the oper-
ation of the nationalist logic with the changing times.
Some observers of AKP appear perplexed by the vagueness of the party’s ideologi-
cal profile53 or think that the party may be hiding a secret agenda for the radical Isla-
mization of Turkey.54 We believe, however, that such accounts fail to ask the proper
questions. Once the positioning of the party is recognized as the agent of the political
field’s re-constitution of its nationalist logic, the meaning of AKP’s tactically elabor-
ate utilization of religious, ethnocentric, liberal, pro-business or multicultural dis-
courses become clearer.
The Ethnic–Political Challenge
Unlike the case of Islamist politicization, nationalist logic could not so easily digest
the political and paramilitary challenge which began in 1984 with the armed insurrec-
tion led by Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kürdistan, PKK). As Mesut
Yeğen, in his book Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish Problem in State
Discourse], demonstrates through discourse analysis, Kurds were portrayed in differ-
ent fashions in history in the discourses of the Kemalist regime.55 It was of utmost
importance for the regime to come up with a new way to eliminate the “Kurdish
problem.” Kurds had been mere mountain Turks for a long time; an uncivilized
people; a community of unruly smugglers and bandits; an offshoot tribe of noble
Turkic communities, whose manners had to be Turkified for the modern nation-
state.56 The emergence of the self-styled Marxist–Leninist PKK, with a radical
program (at least initially) aiming to purge southern Turkey’s feudal elements and
establish a separate socialist state, resulted both in further oppression of all elements
of Kurdish popular culture and the commonplace association of almost all Kurds with
terrorism.57 In this process, the old mountain Turk became first an anarchist, and later
a terrorist, traitor and enemy force.
From 1992 to the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, with the
administrative and legislative support of successive coalition governments, the mili-
tary and the police constructed an oppressive and costly war machine inside eastern
and southeastern provinces. The resurrection of ultra-nationalist paramilitaries, this
time under the official title of Special Forces, the assassination operations against
Kurdish journalists and Kurdish businessmen, the military’s control of the supply
of everyday goods in the region, the burning down of strategic villages and forced
migration out of the rural areas prone to PKK activities, the strict control of the
media—all these, and other questionable policies employed under the operating
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logic of the field, gave the military an opportunity to re-establish its nationalist dom-
ination over the field.58
Consider the position of the Turkish Armed Forces just before the AKP electoral
victory of 2002, during a time when the Turkish economy was just recovering from
crisis, and a time of perceived global insecurity in the aftermath of 9/11: with 15
years of anti-guerrilla warfare experience, operating under permanent red-alert con-
ditions during that time in the security risk regions, and having enjoyed a substantial
budget for its public and classified operations, it was a formidable player inside the
field (and also within the Middle East).
However, the political field resisted the chain of command. Even before the PKK
suspended its armed struggle in 1999 after Öcalan’s arrest, many dissident voices had
begun to be heard inside the field. The most controversial (and unexpected) of these
were the public criticisms of the state’s militarized strategies by the Association of
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSIAD) and the famous Turkish Union
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TOBB) Report of 1995.59 These early
initiatives called for a political–economic or developmental solution, stressing that
the Kurdish Problem did not start and end with the PKK.60 Business circles were
openly skeptical about the function of ultra-nationalist myths for the resolution of
the problem. They responded to the state’s criticisms about the lack of business
investment in the Southeast by implicitly recommending the end of the military’s
strong presence there and the end of the state of emergency rule. Meanwhile The
People’s Democratic Party (HADEP), the then representative legal political actor
within Kurdish politics, mobilized a considerable amount of public support in
Kurdish provinces, despite the obstacles the regime set for it. HADEP’s distancing
itself from PKK’s nationalist-socialist and militaristic jargon also facilitated its credi-
bility, which was based on a political capital totally outside the structure of the field.
Unable to absorb the legal dimension of Kurdish politics, the regime banned three
Kurdish parties (beginning with HADEP in 2003) until 2010, and the latest party,
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) faces further
prosecution.
It is true that the episode that started with Öcalan’s arrest and trial was a time for
media-pumped nationalist hysteria in the country. However, it turned out that this
“ultimate victory over terrorism,” as it was declared, would give an even more chal-
lenging momentum to Kurdish politicization. The PKK had already been deempha-
sizing its secessionist claims since 1995 as the party’s military defeat became
apparent. Also, after Öcalan founded his court defense upon the issue of ethnic
rights, and commanded his party to end armed struggle, the military completely
lost its political control over the circulation of issues like the public debates about
the atrocities of the “state of emergency” regime, or the legalization of Kurdish TV
and Kurdish education.
The turn of the events with Öcalan’s arrest gave new and complex twists to the
challenge of Kurdish politics. The episode further coincided with Turkey’s official
acceptance as a candidate state for EU membership in November 1999, resulting
in an important change in the political opportunity structure for leading Kurdish
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groups. Even the mainstream media somewhat reversed its ultra-nationalist discourse
and opened its screens and pages to debates about why there had been so many
Kurdish rebellions in Ottoman and Turkish history, what the relationship was
between the Kemalist regime and Kurdish tribes, how to define “Turkishness,”
what the limits of ethnic right should be, and so on. Such debates on reconciling
Turkish and Kurdish identity politics still continue today. At one point in 2000,
Şenkal Atasagun, the then head of the National Intelligence Agency, gave a major
press conference, an unheard-of practice in the institution’s history, and repeated
the government’s positive views on the necessity to facilitate the development of
Turkey’s Kurdish minority and enable them to become equal citizens with the
majority. However, soon after, the military published a report prepared by the Intelli-
gence Bureau of the General Staff, announcing that PKK merely gives lip service to
the whole ethnic rights debate, while still preparing for secession, and concluding that
measures like Kurdish language TV should remain out of the question.
While armed violence did not end after 2002, its intensity definitely waned, as
various armed factions within PKK emerged with differing political agendas. The
AKP immediately recognized that, unlike its own absorption and containment of
the Islamist challenge, embracing Kurdish politics within the current rules of political
game would prove difficult. What happened after mid-2005, the moment the party
decided to take up the challenge proactively, reinforces this article’s assessment
about how the political field can be restructured without dislocating the nationalist
logic.
In November 2005, Erdoğan made a public statement in Diyarbakır in southeastern
Turkey, admitting some of the official mistakes of the past and accepting that the
Kurdish problem was the problem of his administration. This marked the beginning
of a more substantial initiative to negotiate the boundaries of what can be politicized
concerning the representation of Kurdish demands. Defining Turkey as an ethnic
mosaic, Erdoğan emphasized the necessity of re-integration and reconciliation
under the supra-national identity of Turkish citizenship.61 To this new discursive
strategy for monopolizing the representation of the Kurdish question, the AKP also
added the dimension of Islam as the point of suture. Turks and Kurds would, accord-
ing to the party line, easily find common ground through the shared belief system.62
This initial step, without the backing (at that point) of any substantial policy initiat-
ive, failed due to the tragic events of March 2006 in Diyarbakır. Following the fun-
erals of four PKK militants killed by the military in an armed clash, street violence
broke out in the city, shops were destroyed and official building were attacked by
Kurdish protestors, some of whom were children. The police responded with vio-
lence, and six citizens were killed, including two children.63 In the face of opposition
accusations of being soft on terrorists, the AKP government decided to respond by re-
enacting imposing the Anti-Terror Law in the region. In the process, the legal and
powerful contender for the political representation of Kurdish demands, DEHAP
(Democratic People’s Party) abolished itself before being banned by the Consti-
tutional Court, a move which further damaged AKP’s gestures toward reconciliation.
On top of this development, which pushed Turkish–Kurdish relations back to the
Historical “Stickiness” of Nationalism 329
status quo of the pre-1999 period, it should also be recalled that the AKP failed to
challenge the paramilitary establishment that surfaced with the “Şemdinli Incident”
of November 2005. At that time, two military officers in civilian clothes and a
former PKK member were caught near the scene of a bombing attack on a bookshop,
with similar bombs and a sketch map of the area in their cars. The judicial process
which would have also attempted to reveal the chain-of-command leading to the
attack, did not lead to satisfactory outcomes from the perspective of democratization.
Despite what Yavuz and Özcan pessimistically observed about the AKP’s policies
concerning the Kurdish question,64 the AKP was not content with the way things
turned out in its confrontation with the Kurdish challenge. At this point, it should
be understood that the AKP had achieved a unique position inside the political
field. It held hegemony over the representations of ethno-religious sentiments. It
was a negotiator with the EU as the most successful, if not the only secular elec-
toral-democratic nation with a Muslim majority population. It was contending with
Israel for leadership in the Middle East. It was the manager of relations between cul-
turally differing, if not opposing business circles. All this inevitably pitted the party
against the subscribers to the pre-2002 political doxa,65 making it politically imposs-
ible for the party to play by the previous rules. Consequently, the AKP rank-and-file
knew that, unless they contained the Kurdish challenge without playing into the
hands of the previous controllers of political capital, the result would be their
undoing.
It is very likely that the AKP strategized to go through with the 2007 elections
before taking any more “courageous” steps regarding the Kurdish challenge.
Despite the failures and missteps of 2006, the party managed to secure southeastern
Turkey, with 52 percent of the votes. While the parliamentary wing of the Kurdish
movement (Democratic Society Party) did not entirely lose legitimacy at the ballot,
it looked like a significant portion of the Kurdish citizens’ consent could be
secured through the AKP’s political credibility on at least three issues which con-
cerned them:
(1) the AKP’s cautious gestures toward ethnic reconciliation within a framework of
Türkiyelilik (literally, “being from Turkey,” instead of “being Turkish”);
(2) its local organization’s campaign to convert Kurds’ religiosity into political
capital for the party (“we are all Muslims”);
(3) its populist promises to alleviate the region’s levels of unemployment and
poverty.66
From the perspective of the AKP’s ability to more strongly maneuver on the issue
of the Kurdish problem, the 4 May 2007 meeting with General Büyükanıt, the Dol-
mabahçe Agreement, was critical. After this meeting, the overtly adversarial political
incursions of the General Staff stopped. Although the military never gave conces-
sions about their preference for predominantly military strategies to deal with the
PKK,67 the generals did not make controversial public moves against political recon-
ciliation with the Kurdish movement during the AKP’s 2008–9 initiatives.
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Moreover, shortly after the July 2007 elections, the still-continuing complex investi-
gation into the “terrorist organization” called Ergenekon was initiated, which opened
up a public debate about unsanctioned military and paramilitary operations backed by
the military.68 Since, like the Şemdinli Incident, many of these operations under scru-
tiny were part of the Armed Forces’ war against PKK, many Kurds approved of the
AKP’s backing of the Ergenekon investigations, as well as the protests against
alleged coup plots which became part of the investigations. The judicial process con-
cerning the Ergenekon organization (which encompassed active military officers,
high profile retired generals, university professors and other prestigious civilian pro-
fessionals) was successfully converted into political capital by AKP, in the form of
building a public face of a party which appears to have fully committed to the dee-
pening and demilitarization of democracy in Turkey.
This volume and quality of political capital, then, beginning with 2008, was better
suited for political investment into a second mobilization for absorbing the Kurdish
challenge. The June 2008 and January 2009 initiatives, which greatly expanded rep-
resentation of the Kurdish language in national radio and TV broadcasting, were
implemented as just the first steps, and the party withstood both left-nationalist and
right-nationalist attacks from the political entrepreneurs of Parliament’s main opposi-
tion parties.69 In August 2009, the Ministry of Internal Affairs hosted a meeting,
chaired by the Minister Beşir Atalay, titled “Resolution of the Kurdish Question:
Towards a Turkish Model.” Later that month, Erdoğan met with Ahmet Türk,
DTP’s leader, and negotiations appeared to have begun, though with no concrete
“road map.” There was promising talk of better educational rights, implementation
of the rights to use the Kurdish language freely in any medium and signs of the gov-
ernment’s intention to somehow try to persuade the PKK to disarm. However, this
appearance of active reconciliation, with apparent recognition (for the first time) of
DTP as a legitimate partner for dialogue, was not as sustainable as the AKP desired:
The AKP’s policy appeared to be making progress in October [2009] when 34
people, including eight PKK militants, hiding out at Qandil Mountain and
Maghmur Camp in northern Iraq surrendered to Turkish authorities at the
call of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. But the plan backfired
when the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) held welcoming
rallies for the 34, triggering a great deal of outrage among ethnic Turks,
many of whom accused the AKP of negotiating with terrorists. The Turkish
government lost further control of the initiative when the main opposition
parties, the secular People’s Republic Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP), seized on the issue, forcing the AKP leadership to reassess its
Kurdish policies.70
On December 11, 2009, the Constitutional Court issued its final decision on the
case against DTP and banned the party for “becoming a focus through which
actions against the indivisible unity of the state with its country and its people
were perpetrated,” or in other words, for “collaborating with terrorists.” With this
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development, despite the quick re-establishment of the current BDP, there remained
very little ground for continuing reconciliation, and the AKP initiative appears to
have come to an abrupt end.
However, this most recent episode in the confrontation between the Kurdish chal-
lenge and the nationalist doxa should not be interpreted as a total failure from the per-
spective of the AKP. The party’s strategy for the monopolization of the political
representation of Kurdish demands appears to have two dimensions. On the one
hand, the political entrepreneurs of this pragmatic-conservative habitus have given
a performance of “willing, sincere, democratic agents who want to reinforce the
bonds of fraternity with the Kurds.” This performance in the second half of 2009
had three functions:
(1) publicly, DTP/BDP was forced to concede and at least join the performance as a
“partner”;
(2) the adversarial rivals, CHP and Nationalist Action Party (MHP), had to call even
more radically for a return to the prior militarized state of affairs, through which
AKP hoped to expose the “anti-democratic” aspirations of its competitors over
the control of political capital;
(3) it was hoped the initiative would bring more legitimacy to the AKP’s claims over
“proper” leadership in the Middle East.
Yet on the other hand, throughout 2009, the DTP’s local organization was under
frequent attack, through arrests, lawsuits, police raids and so on. Such pressures
made it difficult for the party to maintain its relative autonomy from the various
armed factions trying to steer its policies, thus making it easier for the AKP to dele-
gitimize the DTP’s claim to represent Kurdish demands. Thus, the argument that the
Constitutional Court decision to ban DTP ruined the AKP’s plans is not convincing.
For one thing, the decision played into the hands of the party by exposing the democ-
racy-constraining consequences of the 1982 Constitution, which, nowadays, the party
campaigns to revise. On the other hand, the banning gave ammunition to AKP’s
claim that it wished to reconcile, but could not accept such an illegitimate partner
as the DTP, whose leaders were accused of cooperating with terrorists.
Consequently, in 2010, unlike the Islamist challenge, the Kurdish challenge
remained uncontained. For the AKP, the principal outcome of this impasse is the
party’s inability to complete its retooling inside the field. As 2010 draws to an
end, two contentious processes continue to complicate the issue: On the one hand,
police operations and aggressive litigation against groups connected to BDP’s
local organizations in eastern and southeastern provinces continue. Many politicized
Kurdish citizens, even officials from BDP-controlled municipalities, are alleged to be
part of PKK’s operations, arrested and jailed. The BDP continues to complain about
foul play and links these operations with the government’s “secret agenda” to neu-
tralize the Kurdish movement. On the other hand, two interrelated controversial
issues are being publicly debated, around which BDP is campaigning as of December
2010:
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(1) bilingualism in all spheres of public life (principally education), especially in
provinces with majority or substantial Kurdish population;
(2) having autonomous regional powers, in the same high-Kurdish-population areas,
implemented through a proposed “state government” structure similar to Spain
or the USA. As the new elections in June 2011 approach, the ethnic–political
challenge of the Kurdish issue operates through these two political processes.
Without the absorption of the Kurdish challenge, the AKP will be unable to estab-
lish a monopoly over the political capital circulating in the political field and will find
it very difficult to reform the nationalist doxa. So far Prime Minister Erdoğan demon-
strated an aggressive, combative leadership profile, hard to be negotiated with. There-
fore, the challenge of the ethnic–political issues related to Turkish–Kurdish relations
may eventually convince the AKP to revert to the pre-1999 rules of the game:
unyielding nationalism armed by aggressive securitization, instead of deliberative-
democratic policies.
In Turkish political field, as in many other structured social worlds, “one needs to
possess a great deal of capital to carry out a successful revolution.”71 For the sake of
argument, let us assume that the party can sustain its current containment of the
unruly elements inside the Turkish Armed Forces and institutionalize government-
controlled mechanisms (which must be grounded enough to survive after another
party comes to power) to dismantle military autonomy. Even with that assumption,
the success of the AKP’s “revolution”72 will depend on the ability of the strategic
craftsmen of the party to manufacture sufficient credibility to gain the loyalty of
Kurdish citizens and completely marginalize the BDP. The other option, the path
that would possibly deepen democratization inside the political field and break the
hold of nationalism, contradicts with the hegemonic policy performance we have wit-
nessed in the AKP so far. Finding an operational middle ground with the BDP and
PKK, without attempting to repress the social bases of the movement represented
by these two, would perhaps be the boldest move inside modern Turkey’s political
field since the declaration of the Republic. However, the current AKP leadership is
signaling its will to absorb and hegemonize. That path may get the votes in June
2011, but the nationalist doxa will remain unchallenged.
Conclusion: The Symbolic Power of Nationalism
If the arguments about the structural continuity73 between imperial (Ottoman) and
Republican (Kemalist) military, legislative and administrative institutions have any
validity; and if, by studying the history of modern Turkey, one can discern an endur-
ing political influence of the military, then it is not a meaningless task to try to add the
usually missing political–sociological dimension. This is the relationship between
different political agents’ homological career trajectories and biographies and their
nationalist practices and dispositions. The conditioning of habitus by the nationalist
doxa is particularly obvious in the case of initiation into the front ranks of mainstream
media groups, where numerous upper middle class columnists can be found, who
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have internalized the modus operandi of the symbolic power of nationalism.
However, the impact of the structure of the political field also seeps through the
activities of certain civil society organizations, which begin to operate as political
extensions of the main players in the field, supplying various (intellectual, policy-
making, journalistic, philanthropic, even paramilitary) services for the propagation
of political capital.
The Turkish-nationalist set of embodied beliefs about the cosmology of the Turkish
nation, the nation’s religion, its language; about the greatness of the Turks and their
“ethnic and religious sensitivities which should be respected”; and about the “proper
cultural tastes” of the nation, etc., are “sticky,” both diachronically and synchronically.
On the one hand, over time, these beliefs structure behaviors and dispositions across
smaller social worlds within the nation. Inside the fields of literary (and other artistic)
production, religion, education, bureaucracy, etc., agents learn to operate according to
the “properly national” doxa and their misrecognition about this national existence
becomes natural to them. This taken-for-granted and thus unchallenged set of beliefs
can then be inherited by other new initiates inside various fields. On the other hand,
the operation of nationalism is synchronic. At a given time inside the social space of
the nation, nationalism can operate horizontally, across large chunks of the population,
invoking what Bourdieu called “the logic aggregation,” which
imposes itself whenever groups are reduced to the state of aggregates, sets of
juxtaposed, accumulated, agglomerated elements which, like the individuals
present at a given moment in the waiting hall of a railway station, coexist
partes extra partes, like grains in a heap of sand, without communication or
cooperating as do the members of groups mobilized towards an action, political
or otherwise.74
This is the magic, or the mystery of the formation of the general will. Once political
actors secure a stable monopoly over political capital, that is, they are able, using the
agglomerated (usually in the ballot box) misrecognition that they are the representa-
tives of the national will of the Turkish people, to accumulate the trust of citizens,
they can conjure up the group they claim to represent. This aggregation of infinitely
diverse individuals who do not know much about each other can be declared, by their
representatives, as a sacred community. This invocation through the political field has
a real effect on practices, dispositions and affections, as people find a (misrecognized)
sense and purpose in belonging to the category into which they are called. That cat-
egory (that of the Turk, the Kurd, etc.), at the particular time and place is it is invoked,
instills a logic of distinction onto the agent, separating her/him from other (not
necessarily adversarial, but different) categories and binding her/him to the familiar
one on this side of the boundary.
Throughout the history of modern Turkish politics, there have been ceaseless
struggles over the construction of this boundary; and that historical process of con-
struction essentially corresponds to the source of the symbolic power of Turkish
nationalism. In other words, this article has argued that the nationalist logic of
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aggregation, with its capacity to efface many other minor (and most often politically
defined as cumbersome or troublesome) differences, has been the primary issue inside
the political field. What kind of a creature is the Turk? What kind should he be? It is
argued here that the struggles inside the political field determine how power is distrib-
uted across classes or other social groups in other fields inside the social space of the
nation. Rather, in the Turkish case examined here, it is presented that, because of
the historical thinness of the system of civic checks and balances, and the weakness
of the structures of constitutional citizenship (considering the current constitution was
sanctioned by a military junta), the capable representatives of social groups can tap
and consolidate (economic, religious, etc.) power through the only game in town:
the logic of aggregation and boundary generation, ridden with authoritarian and con-
servative myths. Various political parties and military factions in history have
accessed this political capital by converting lots of economic, religious and cultural
capital into their version of the representation of the people. The heaviest price
paid for being stuck in this game of stakes has been the slow pace of deepening
democracy in terms of expanding the sphere of rights and liberties.
What about the near future of the political field in Turkey? If symbolic power is
defined as a real force which is “defined in and through a given relation between
those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e., in the very structure of
the field in which belief is produced and reproduced.”75 Today’s AKP commands
a lot of this power in many parts of the polity, while enjoying an incomplete, but
effective domination over the nationalist means of representation inside the political
field. On the other hand, there are real opportunities for diminishing the hold of the
nationalist logic over the political field. Despite the current disunity of Europe, radiat-
ing doubts for many member and candidate countries, the accession process can be
transformed into a stimulus for developing a post-national citizenship inside the
field, challenging the old nationalist doxa. The Kurdish politics of recognition is
haunted by its own nationalist limitations, but the possibility of articulating
Kurdish reintegration claims with all-embracing economic redistribution claims
might again pose an alternative to nationalism and expand the sphere of freedom.
Unfortunately, however, with no promising political powerhouses in sight to offer
an alternative to the AKP, it seems unlikely that the field will be sown with the demo-
cratizing seeds of post-national ideals any time soon.
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see Ömer Faruk Loğoğlu, Ismet Inonu and the Making of Modern Turkey (Ankara: İnönü Vakfı, 1997).
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43. Ahmad (1993); Çağlar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s,” in Sibel
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William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the
AKP (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).
47. Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1998),
pp. 91–107.
48. The founding father of this political alternative for Islamic modernization, the leader of the banned
Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, is also known for his campaign slogan: “If Atatürk lived today,
he would vote for us.” For an analysis of the elements of Welfare Party’s politics which agree with
Kemalism, see Menderes Çınar, “Postmodern Zamanların Kemalist Projesi,” Birikim, No. 91
(1996), pp. 32–38.
49. More sound analyses of that time have pointed out the Welfare/Virtue Party’s willingness to glue itself
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54. Soner Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Still a Western Ally?” Wall Street Journal (January 27, 2009). (http://
online.wsj.com/article/s812326615668940745.html).
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59. Doğu Ergil, Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tesbitler [The Eastern Problem: Prognoses and Findings]
(Ankara: TOBB Yayını, 1995).
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